


INFORMATION PAPER

AFOP-PS
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SUBJECT: Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Friction and Issues Associated with Moving ARFORGEN from a Demand-Driven to a Supply-Based Model.

1. Purpose: To engage the Under Secretary of the Army/Chief Management Officer (USA/CMO) in an in-depth discussion of internal and external sources of friction that affect execution of the Army's core mission process: Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).
2. Background: This discussion is a background brief presented to the USA/CMO to inform him on the key ARFORGEN issues facing the Army.
 - This discussion focuses on sources of internal and external friction or loss of optimization in the ARFORGEN process. A framework for analysis is shown immediately below:



- One fundamental reason for friction is that policies, procedures, processes and infrastructure necessary to successfully direct and support the linear force generation model of yesteryear are not adequate to support the rotational force generation model of today.
- The Army adopted its supply-based force generation model in 2006 well after the other Services adopted similar models and while already involved in two extended land

campaigns. The demands of these campaigns have prevented the Army from establishing a sustainable rotational pace and hindered acceptance of the new model. Those demands also impeded a methodical revision of legacy processes and systems to reflect the new model.

- Our legacy force generation process was linear, with significant forward deployed units and clearly defined contingency and reinforcing forces. The Reserve Component was a classic strategic reserve that required significant post-mobilization training prior to employment. The linear model of conventional force generation exhibited a tiered readiness characteristic. The new force generation model – ARFORGEN – is a rotational model, serving a CONUS-based, modular, progressively readied, expeditionary Army that is in constant motion.
- Observations and Recommendations contained in this paper should be included in ongoing efforts nested in the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) Business Initiatives Reviews (BIR), conducted under the auspices of the Army Management Enterprise (AME)

3. Internal Friction. There are ten sources of friction which exist internal to the Department of the Army (HQDA). Recommended institutional adaptations are included to stimulate discussion:

- 1. Generating Force Title 10 functions are not properly aligned to support the ARFORGEN process. Recommendation: Adopt an enterprise approach and enfranchise enterprise “leads.”
- 2. Generating Force policies, systems and associated processes and procedures remain linear and disconnected from the rotational Operating Force. Recommendation: The Army must undertake a comprehensive review of its policies, systems and processes, specifically as they relate to the categories of readiness, force generation and mobilization.
- 3. Core Enterprise “leaders” lack sufficient directive authorities (e.g. over Direct Reporting Units (DRUs)) to establish priorities crucial to ARFORGEN execution in ARFORGEN horizon years one (Execute) and two (Verify). Recommendation: Publish an ARFORGEN Army Regulation which establishes prioritization authorities; use the Readiness Core Enterprise (RCE) and ARFORGEN Synchronization Board to enhance collaboration and synchronizarion.
- 4. Challenges in data sharing and Army Information Technologies writ large hinder the efficient execution of ARFORGEN. Recommendation: The Office of Business Transformation (OBT) must drive the vision of an Army Business Architecture enabled by an integrated Systems Architecture. The ARFORGEN Synchronization Tool (AST) is the trunk of a larger ARFORGEN Knowledge Management initiative required to establish a common operating picture and synchronize to that picture.

- 5. Army's staff's focus and planning horizons are "skewed" to execution.
Recommendation: Reorient ARSTAF to ARFORGEN strategic horizon (three to six years) and CEs to the execution horizon (one to two years).
- 6. DRUs aligned to the Army Staff creates structural complexity and encumbers the ARSTAF's ability to conduct strategic planning; results in the loss of four star advocacy for the DRUs; and compels centralized decision-making at DA level. Recommendation: Revise and reissue DA GOs for applicable DRUs to report to commanders (e.g. ACOM or ASCCs) as applicable. Revise AR 10-87 accordingly (AR 10-87 is the Army Regulation that specifies the missions, functions and command and staff relationships between the major commands of the US Army—i.e. ACOMs, ASCCs and DRUs). Establish alignment of ASCCs with the Readiness Core Enterprise.
- 7. Current organizational "silos" are functionally optimal, but institutionally sub-optimal; they have not transformed to effectively meet the requirements of an expeditionary and campaign capable Army. Recommendations are the same as for #6 above.
- 8. Modular Army Training and Readiness Authority and conventional Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) sourcing are sub-optimal for force generation. Recommendation: Align MTOE rotational structure to the Readiness Core Enterprise; this is the most effective manner to rationalize Training and Readiness Authority for CONUS-based forces.
- 9. The Reserve Component is not fully operationalized and it is unclear going forward if the Army is intent on programming for an Operational RC. Recommendation: POM for an Operational RC.
- 10. Mobilization policies, infrastructure and command and control are ill-suited to support continuous mobilization, thus, the need to create an opportunity for the Readiness Core Enterprise to affect funds in the year of execution. Recommendation: Redesign the current mobilization process by implementing the recommendations in the Mobilization Tiger Team's Concept Plan. Program for these recommendations commencing the beginning FY 12.

4. External Friction. A comprehensive discussion of ARFORGEN friction points also includes external sources of friction which exist specifically in the Global Force Management process. The AME must address these strategic level issues in concert with the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Business Transformation (OBT) or during the BIR:

- 1. Centralization: GFM is over-centralized.
- 2. Prioritization: GFM lacks a meaningful prioritization scheme.
- 3. Imbalance: GFM focuses on COCOM requirements and overlooks Service equities.

- 4. Asymmetry: GFM biased towards allocation at the cost of assignment and apportionment segments.
- 5. Asynchronous: GFM and PPBES are not synchronized.
- 6. Under-developed: GFM's Systems Architecture development is ahead of its Business Architecture.
- 7. Disciplined Execution: Uneven application of GFM rules and procedures creates unnecessary friction.
- 8. Illiteracy: Inadequate training of Joint & Service GFM practitioners.
- Consolidated Recommendation: The OBT must work in concert with the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Business Transformation (OBT) to reduce external friction points.

5. The Way Ahead: The OBT, in concert with the DoD OBT, CEs and the AME, should use the Army Campaign Plan, Business Initiatives Review (BIR) or other applicable process to design and implement improvements to reduce sources of internal and external ARFORGEN friction. Use observations and recommendations contained in this paper as appropriate. All concerned parties should monitor developments and as appropriate play a direct role in designing and implementing initiatives to reduce ARFORGEN friction.

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Approved by MG Graham